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RECENT CASES
CARRIERS-ELEVATOR PASSENGERS-CARE REQUIRED-PRESUMPTION OF
NEGLIGENCE.-HELMLY V. SAVANNAH OFF. BLDG. Co., 79 S. E., (GA.), 364.
-Held, that the relation between one owning and operating an elevator
for passengers and those carried in it is similar to the relation between
carrier and passenger which arises in the case of an ordinary common car-
rier of passengers. The exercise of extraordinary diligence is required
in the transportation of passengers while in the elevator, and also in giving
intended passengers reasonable opportunity to. enter it, and if, in the
operation of the elevator, an injury occurs to one who is a passenger
therein, or who is entering it with the intention of becoming a passenger,
on proof of the injury, a presumption of negligence arises against the
owner.
Although spoken of by some courts as common carriers of passengers,
Treadwell v. Whittier, 80 Cal.; 574; Springer v. Ford, 189 Ill., 430, the
owners and managers of passenger elevators cannot properly be so classed.
This will be seen when the nature of the business of operating a passen-
ger elevator is considered, for the proprietor of such owes no duty to the
public to accept all who offer themselves for transportation, and who stand
ready to pay the legal fare, and comply with his reasonable rules and regu-
lations. Seaver v. Bradley, 179 Mass., 329; see also Hutchinson on Car-
riers, (3d ed.) sec. 100. Nevertheless, with reference to the safety of their
passengers, the law has imposed on the owner of passenger elevators
duties precisely similar to those exacted of passenger carriers by railroads.
So, they are bound to exercise the highest degree of care and diligence in.
and about the operation of such elevators that is practicable, to prevent
injury to passengers being carried therein. Beidler v. Branshaw, 200 Ill.,
425; Kentucky Hot. Co. v. Camp, 97 Ky., 424; Goodsell v. Taylor, 41 Minn.,
207. So, too, the obligation to those attempting to become passengers is
the same, and the highest degree of precaution and care must be used not
to injure them while entering the elevator. Morgan v. Saks, 143 Ala., 139;
South. Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Lawson, 97 Tenn., 367. And the same
degree of care in the construction and repair of the elevators must be
exercised as is required in the construction and repair of an engine or
other machinery of railway transportation. Oberfelder v. Doran, 26 Neb.,
118. But in Michigan, New York and Rhode Island, a different rule of
liability is enforced. In these jurisdictions one maintaining a passenger
elevator is not held to the care required'of a common carrier; all that
is required of him is that he exercise reasonable care and prudence as to
the construction and operation of the same. Burgess v. Stowe, 134 Mich.,
204; McGrell v. Buffalo Off. Bldg. Co., 153 N. Y., 265; Edwards v. Manu-
facturer's Bldg. Co., 27 R. I., 248. The basis on which these decisions are
put is that the owner of a passenger elevator receives no compensation for
the carriage, and that the right of any person to be carried is based on the
implied invitation to enter which the owner of the property is deemed to
extend to all with business on the premises. To such pt-sons the law
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imposes on the owner the duty to see that the premises are in a reasonably
safe condition. See Griffen v. Manice, 166 N. Y., 188. But this reason is
illogical, as the compensation of the owner comes from the increased rent
charged for such conveniences. In all jurisdictions, the falling of the
elevator, or the breaking of the machinery or appliances by which it is
operated, raises a priim a facie presumption of want of care on the part of
the one having control thereof, and responsible for its safety. Treadwell
v. Whittier, supra; Edwards v. Manufacturers' Bldg. Co., supra; Fox v.
Philadelphia, 208 Pa., 127. As between the two rules, the better one would
seem to be that upheld by the weight of authority, as there is no distinc-
tion in principle between the degree of care that should be, required from
a carrier of passbngers horizontally, by means of railway cars, and one
who carries them vertically, by means of an elevator. The holding in the
principal case is sound and in accord with the better rule.
CARRIERS-PASSENOERS-CARETAKER.-ST. Louis & S. F. Co. v. NICHOLS,
136 P. (OKLA.), 159.-Plaintiff shipped horse on defendant's road and
shipping contract set out that a caretaker would be given free passage, but
since in plaintiff's case charge was made by hundredweight and not by
carload, be in fact was not entitled to free passage. Plaintiff did not know
this and in good faith applied to the conductor of the freight train, who
allowed him to ride in the caboose, where he was injured. Held, that it
was within the apparent scope of the conductor's authority to give such
permission and therefore the plaintiff was a passenger.
A master is bound by the act of his employe or servant only if the
act is within the actual or apparent scope of his authority. L. & N. R.
Co. v. Scott's Adm., 108 Ky., 392. So there arises a prima facie presump-
tion that one riding on a passenger train is a passenger and that one riding
on a freight train is not. Bergan v. Central Vt. Ry. Co., 82 Ct., 574; Pur-
ple v. Union Pacific Ry., 114 Fed., 123. There also arises the presumption
that a freight conductor has no authority to permit any one to ridt as a
passenger. Waterbury v. N. Y. C. & H. R. Ry., 17'Fed., 671. But if there
exists a custom for freight conductors to carry passengers and the rail-
road permits it, they are liable to one who bona fide rides as a passenger.
Waterbury v. N. Y. C. & H. R. Ry., supra. Or where the traffic, freight
and passenger, is by same trains, a conductor may create the liability even
though no passengers were allowed on that particular train. Lucas v. Mil-
waukee & St. Paul R. Co., 33 Wisc., 41. There are cases which hold that
the mere appearance of the freight train is enough to put one on notice
that the conductor has no authority to accept anyone as a passenger, par-
ticularly where the traffic was not intermingled in any way. Eaton v. Del.,
L. & W. R. Co., 57 N. Y., 382. Even in such a case the acceptance of a
passenger, if it can be brought within the apparent scope of the conduc-
tor's authority as a freight conductor, would bind the master. Lawson,
Adin. v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co., 64 Wisc., 447. The question
then would be whether under the circumstances it wxas reasonable to sup-
pose that the conductor had such authority. Purple v. Union Pac. Ry. Co.,
114 Fed., 123. Where there is a custom to carry a caretaker as a passenger
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on a freight train to care for live stock the shipper would have a right to
suppose that whoever was in charge of the train had authority to accept
him as a passenger where there was no contract entered into for hib pas-
sage. L. S. & M. S. R. Co. v. Brown, 123 Ill., 162. Such an act would be
within the apparent scope of the conductor's authority in managing and
controlling the train. Lawson, Adin. v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. R. Co.,
supra. In the principal case the terms of the shipping contract were very
properly used to show a custom to carry a caretaker and ground for the
plaintiff's bona fide belief in his right to a passage and the conductor's
authority to accept him.
EVIDENcE-ADMISSIBILITY OF PHOTOGRAPHS.-ZANCANELLA V. OMAHA &
C. B. ST. R. Co., 142 N. V. (NEB.), 190. The plaintiff was injured after
alighting from defendant's trolley car by being run over by another car on
a parallel track. Trial court refused to allow defendant to introduce four
photographs of the scene of the accident on the ground that it was capable
of verbal description. Held, that this ruling was erroneoues because
photographs may come in at the discretion of the trial court and are not
excluded because the place may be verbally described.
Any plan or picture or photograph made by the hand of man is admis-
sible in evidence if verified by proof that it is a true representation of the
subject. Blair v. Inhabitants of Pelham, 118 Mass., 420. A lapse of time
before taking the photograph makes no difference if the changes are trivial
and are explained. Dyson, Adrn. v. The N. Y. & N. E. R. Co., 57 Conn.
9; Dederichs v. The Salt Lake City R. Co., 13 (Utah) Tanner, 34. But
some courts have held that the locus in quo must be the same in the pic-
ture as at the time of the accident. Colmbia & P. D. R. Co. v. The State
to the Use of Huff, 105 Md., 34; C. C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Monaghan,
4 Ill. App., 498. It is, however, universally held that the pictures must be a
fair representation and must be verified by competent witnesses. Cowley
v. People, 83 N. Y., 464; Archer v. The N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., 106
N. Y. App., 589. Alone they are testimonial nonentities-they must come
in on the credibility of some witness. Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. I, sec.
790. The decision of the trial court is subject to review on appeal. Archer
v. The N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., supra; Otis v. The State, 30 Fla.,
256. But in Massachusetts the decision of the trial court in regard to
photographs is not open to exception. Blair v. Inhabitants of Pelhan, 118
Mass., 420; Commonwealth v. Coe, 115 Mass., 481. The principal case is
in accord with the weight of authority in leaving the question of admissi-
bility to the trial court subject to review.
EVIDENcE-REs GESTAE-STATEMENT OF INJURED PERsON.-GREENER V.
GEN. ELECTRIC Co., 102 N. E. (N. Y.), 527.-In an action for the death of
an empoyee caused by falling from a ladder, his statements, while lying
on the floor after falling, in response to an inquiry as to what had hap-
pened, that his feet were broken and that the ladder beni over, were not
admissible, since the declarations of an injured person are admissible only
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when they are so spontaneous or natural as to exclude the idea of fabrica-
tion, and not when they are in the nature of a narrative of what had hap-
pened.
Declarations of an injured person are not admissible as evidence un-
less they form part of the res gestae. Collins v. State, 46 Neb., 37; Harness
et al. v. Harness et al., 40 Ind., 384. To be part of the res gestae the
declarations must have been made at the time of the act done which they
are supposed to characterize, and have been calculated to unfold the nature
and quality of the facts they were intended to express and so harmonize
with them as obviously to constitute one transaction. Enos v. Tuttle, 3
Conn., 247; Metchum v. State, 11 Ga., 615. They need not be exactly
coincident, in point of time, with the principal fact. People v. Vernon, 35
Call., 49; Davids v. People, 192 Ill., 176. But they should be so near as to
suggest absence of any fabrication, and it should appear to be spontaneous
and not the relation of a past transaction. Ford's Case, 40 Tex. Cr. Rep.,
280; State v. Locekett, 168 Miss., 480. If the declarationg are simply the
narrative of a past event they do not form part of the res gestae and are
not admissible. Binnis v. State, 57 Ind., 46; Lund v. Inhabitants of Tyngs-
borough, 9 Cush., 36. The rule of res gestae is well established, but courts
have differed in its application. Some courts have held declarations of the
deceased made after the injury, but in the absence of the defendant, were
inadmissible. Hall v. State, 132 Ind., 317; People v. Ah Lee, 60 Cal., 85.
There are some authorities which hold the declarations must be confined
to such expressions and exclamations as furnish evidence of a present
existing pain or malady. Ins. Co. v. Mosley, 8 Wall., 397, Clifford, J., dis-
sented. If the deceased made statements at the instant of the injury, the
subsequent statements have been held admissible as being a continuation
of the sentence uttered at the instant of the injury. State v. Martin, 124
Mo., 529; Johnson v. State, 8 Wyom., 494. Staterfients made from five to
sixty minutes after the accident have been held not admissible as part of
the res gestae. Steinhofel v. C. M. & St. P. R. Co., 92 Wis., 123; Rich-
inond & D. & R. R. Co. v. Hammond, 93 Ala., 181; M. C. R. Co. v.
Womack, Adin., 84 Ala., 194; People v Wong Ark, 96 Cal., 125. There is
a good deal of authority contra. Hanover R. Co. v. Coyle, 55 Pa. St., 396;
Comm. v. John McPike, 3 Cush., 181; Rex. v. Foster, 6 C. & P., 325. In
criminal actions the authorities are about equally divided in the application
of the rule. In civil actions the courts seem to -favor the holding of the
principal case. There seems to be no sound reason for the distinction. If
from all the circumstances the exclusion of the evidence would work an
undue hardship on the injured party, and enable the accused to escape
from what otherwise is a just liability, the evidence should be admitted.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF-SALE OF LAND-RECEIPT OF PURCHASE MONEY.-
ROHRBACH v. HAM MILL, 143 N. W. (IowA), 872.-Under sections 4625-4626
of the Code providing that contracts for the transfer of an interest in land
must be in writing except where the purchase money or a part thereof has
been received by the vendor, it was held, that the court did not err in
instructing that plaintiff could recover for the breach of a parol contract
YALE LAW JOURNAL
to transfer land if the jury should find that a certain check for $500 was
given and accepted as part of the purchase pricewhere there was evidence
from which the jury could find that the check was so given and accepted.
"Purchase money" required by the statute has been defined as anything
of value which the parties agree on and which the seller is willing to accept
in payment. Johnson v. Taylor, 101 Miss., 78; Benjamin on Sales, sec. 194.
The acceptance must be unconditional and in absolute discharge of the
obligation. Leonard v. Roth, 164 Mich., 646. The provision of the statute
is on the ground of public policy and cannot be waived by the parties-
something must be given in earnest. Groomer v. McMillan, 143 Mo. App.,
612. A check given and accepted in payment and cashed has been held to
be a part payment. Hunter v. Wetsell, 17 Hun., 135; Johnson v. Morrison,
163 Mich., 322. But a check received by the vendor but not cashed was
not enough to satisfy the statute. Groomer v. McMillan, 143 Mo. App., 612.
In such a case there is an implication of law that the check is not to con-
stitute the absolute payment required by the statute until it is paid, or the
loss thereon results from the unreasonable delay of the holder in present-
ing it for payment. Groomer v. MeMillan, supra. But by an express
agreement to receive the check in absolute payment the mere transfer of
it may be sufficient even thought it is afterwards not paid. Logan v. Car-
roll, 7 Mo. App., 613; Hunter v. Wetscll, 17 Hun., 135. The decision in
the principal case seems to be well within the authorities in submitting to
the jury the question of an express agreement on the part of the defendant
to accept the check in absolute payment and discharge of the purchase
price.
ORDINANCF- "CONSTRUCTION-SUBSTITUTION OF ONE WORD FOR ANOTHER.
-PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEw YORK V. FRUDENDERG. New York Court of
Appeals. Decided Oct. 21, 1913. Martlett and Miller, JJ., dissented. The
provisions of the Sanitary Code of the City of New York making it a mis-
demeanor for any person to "receive or have" in his possession any re-
ceptacle used in the transportation of milk or cream which has not been
washed-and cleansed immediately after emptying, is to be read "receive
and have in his possession". As thus construed the provision violates no
constitutional right and is within the police power of the state.
Ordinances enacted by a municipality, in its favor, and against per-
sons bound thereby, have the force of laws passed by the legislature of
the state. People ex rel. Lodes v. Dept. of Health, 117 N. Y. App. Div.,
856; Dillon, Mun. Corp., 5th ed., Vol. II, sec. 573. The rules for the con-
struction of ordinances are the same as for statutes. Matter of Yick Wo,
68 Cal., 294; Denning v. Young, 62 Kan., 217. But ordinances are especially
entitled to a reasonable construction. Whittock v. West, 26 Conn., 406.
Statutes must be construed so as to be consistent with justice and the
dictates of natural reason, though contrary to the strict letter of the law.
Ham v. M'Claws and Wife, 1 Bay (S. C.), 93. Courts will never'adopt a
construction that makes the statute violate the Constitution if any other
is susceptable from the words. Standard Oil Co. v. Comm., 119 Ky., 75.
The construction must, if possible, be such as will enable the statute to
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have effect, Dow v. Harris, 4 N. H., 17, provided the construction is rea-
sonable. Rbbson v. Doyle, 191 Ill., 566. If a statute is capable of two con-
structions, one of which is in harmony with the Constitution and the other
not, the former should be adopted. Harmon v. City of Chicago, 140 Ill.,
374. If absurd consequences or those manifestly against common reason
arise collaterally out of a statute, it is void pro tanto, 1 Harper (S. C.),
101. It is difficult to sustain the holding of the principal case. The gen-
erally accepted rules for construing statutes and the authorities cited in
the opinion do not fully sustain the decision. In Rome v. Phillips, 24.
N. Y., 463, cited in the opinion, a will and not a statute was before the
court. In Matter of Sugden v. Partridge, 174 N. Y., 87, cited as an author-
ity, the court held where a statute is capable of two constructions, the one
which is in harmony with the Constitution should be .adopted provided it
is consistent with the legislative intent. In Camp v. Rogers, 44 Conn., 291,
the court to give effect to a statute, defined the word "owiner" to mean
the person who had a special right of property in the thing for a particular
purpose as well as the person in whom was vested the legal title. People
ecx rcl. Gas Co. v. Rice, 138 N. Y., 151, comes the nearest to sustaining the
principal case. The court in construing a statute enlarging the powers of
gas and electric light companies, held the word "or" should be read 'and'
because it was clear from the whole act that if the word "or" was retained
the statute would be inconsistent and contrary to the manifest inten.t of
the legislature. On principle the dissenting opinion presents the sounder
view. "No doubt," says Bartlett, J.. "the ordinance could be reconstructed
so as to be reasonable. * * * In my judgment we are without power, how-
ever easy it may be, to make a good ordinance instead of a bad one."
RAPE-VARIANCE-NAMiE OF PROSECUTRIX.-STATE v. DRAKEFORD, 78
S. E. (N. C.), 308.-Name of the prosecutrix was alleged in the indict-
ment for rape to be "Lila" H., when the evidence showed that it was
"Liza" H.-Held, that this at the most is an immaterial variance.
In all indictments for crime where the commission of a trespass
against the 'person or property of another is a necessary ingredient, the
namne of the injured party, if known, must be stated. State v. Pollock, 105
Mo. App., 273. The reason for the rule is to identify the transaction so
that the defendant may not be taken by surprise and may be able to pro-
tect himself against a second prosecution for the same offence. State v.
Moxlcy, 41 Mon., 402. The misnomer must be of a party whose existence
is essential to the offense charged. U. S. v. Howard, 1 Baldw., 293. A few
cases have gone so far as to hold that a name must be proven "precisely"
as laid. Sullivan v. People, 6 Colo. App., 458. But the generally adopted
rule is that if the names are idem sonans, i. e., if they may be sounded alike
without doing violence to the powers of the letters in the variant or-
thography, then the variance is immaterial. Ward v. State, 28 Ala., 53;
Vance v. State, 75 Ind., 460. The name used in the indictment may also
vary from the name proved if it is a corruption, abbreviation or of the
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same derivation as the latter and there is, evidence that the person was
generally known thereby. Owens v. State, 20 S. W., 558; State v. Murberg,
56 Wash., 384. Wharton on Criminal Law, Vol 1, sec. 260, says, "Any
variance as to sound of the name of a material third party is fatal at com-
mon law." The principal case in holding the variance in the names to be
immaterial-even though they are not idem sonans seems to depart from a
well established rule, and from the facts in the case it does not appear that
such a holding was necessary to prevent an obstruction of justice.
WILLS-CONSTRUCTIoN-REPUGNANT CLAUSES.-IN RE MOORE'S ESTATE,
88 ATL. (PA.), 432.-Held, that where a clause of the testatrix's will be-
queathed the "income from all my property" to be divided equally between
M. and F. while they live, and at their death to be equally divided among
their children, and a subsequent clause provided, "I will all my personal
property to my beloved Aunt M., and at her death to go to her children
L. and E.," that the later clause had reference to property about the person
of the testatrix, and not the income producing property contemplated by
the first clause, and hence there was no repugnancy in the will, and M.
did not acquire the entire estate under the later clause.
In construing a will a court should give effect to every word of the
will, without change or rejection, provided an effect can be given to it not
inconsistent with the general intent of the whole will taken together.
Homer v. Shelton, 2 Met. (Mass.), 202; Ingersoll's Appeal, 86 Pa. St., 240.
But this intention is sometimes made doubtful through repugnancy be-
tween the several parts of the will. Russell v. Hartley, 83 Conn., 654;
Pickering v. Langdon, 22 Me., 430. When such case arises the inconsistent
clauses should be harmonized if possible so as to give effect to each
clause. In re Phillips, 205 Pa. St., 504; Matter of Tille Guarantee, etc., Co.,
195 N. Y., 339; Jenks v. Jackson, 127 Ill., 341. But where the clauses are
entirely irreconcilable, so that they cannot possibly stand together, the
clause which is posterior in local position shall prevail, the subsequent
words being considered to denote a subsequent intention. Jarman on Wills,
p. 436. But see Day v. Wallace, 124 Ill., 256, where it was held that where
a testator in several parts of his will devised the same property to dif-
ferent persons, the two devisees took the property concurrently as. tenants
in common. To effectuate a clear intention, as apparent upon the whole
will, words may be transformed, supplied, rejected, or changed. But none
of these things can be done if there can be any rational construction of the
words as they stand. Gardener on Wills, p. 376. Personal property is the
right or interest, less than freehold, which a man has in realty, or any right
or interest which he has in things movable. Bony. Dic. The principal case
goes far in trying to give effect to the intention of the testator. It is not
probable, as the court says, "that she would give one-half thereof to Mrs.
Foote and her children, and then intentionally take it away from them by
the next stroke of the pen." But it is an exceedingly liberal, if not a
forced construction, to hold that "personal property" in the later clause
had reference merely to the property about the person of the testatrix.
